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With the rise of neoliberal thinking during the 1980s and the associated preference for export-
oriented development strategies, trade liberalisation became a firmly established orthodoxy 
within policy elites. The idea of ‘special and differential’ treatment for developing countries, 
within the rules of global trade, came under increasing pressure as a result. In the context of 
UK policy towards Africa, this is a view that was entrenched during the period that followed 
the end of the Cold War. As Williams noted ‘both the Conservative and Labour Governments 
have subscribed to … the ostensibly mutually beneficial nature of international trade and 
FDI’ (2004: 52). 
However, at the turn of the century and the period beginning with the protests at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial in Seattle in 1999, it seemed like the emergent 
global justice movement could offer an avenue for counter-hegemonic struggle, which would 
be able to challenge the ideas and institutions of global governance, particularly those 
governing world trade. Hence, the theoretical concerns of this chapter are to investigate the 
extent to which these new social movements have been able to shift both the material and 
ideational terrain of global trade. Existing critical literature suggests this has proven difficult. 
For example, Paterson has argued that in the case of the WTO, it has been able to employ a 
strategy of trasformismo so that any changes implemented are simply ‘cosmetic and designed 
to assimilate and absorb counter-movements and ideas to make them consistent with the 
demands of the global economy’ (2009: 57).1 In a more general sense it has been argued that 
‘one of the disappointments of NGOs has been their tendency to identify more readily with 
alternative forms of interventions than with more systemic changes’ (Bebbington, Hickey and 
Mitlin, 2008: 5). McSweeney (2014: 280) goes further, in raising the question of whether the 
problem is simply one of focusing too much on lobbying and policy reforms rather than 
structural changes, by reminding us that civil society represents a terrain where hegemony 
can be reproduced as well as resisted. 
Within the context of UK-Africa relations, the Trade Justice Movement (TJM) has been 
at the centre of attempts to challenge the hegemonic assumptions of the developmental 
benefits of trade liberalisation. TJM became one of the three pillars of the Make Poverty 
History (MPH) coalition, which played such a key role in 2005 in shaping understanding 
within the UK of what the main barriers to African development are. Often perceived as the 
poor relation of the MPH coalition, TJM’s focus on the rules of global trade added a crucial 
structural dimension to the diagnosis of African poverty and underdevelopment. Hence, this 
chapter’s focus on the role played by TJM, within the broader context of British campaigns 
for African development (see Chapter 8 above for a discussion of the Enough Food If 
campaign, which was the next major development campaign coalition after MPH). 
The research for this chapter included a series of twenty-two qualitative semi-structured 
research interviews with relevant individuals, which were conducted during the period from 
July 2015 until September 2016. Interviewees were selected with two key criteria in mind. 
First, that a range of the most important organisations within TJM were represented and 
second that the entire period since TJM’s formation in 2000 was covered. 
TJM was created at a time when a nascent global justice movement was just emerging. In 
the UK, NGOs were starting to take advantage of the relaxation of charity law constraints that 
had been achieved in 1995, which enabled them to adopt more overtly political campaigns 
(Saunders, 2009: 50). TJM is a coalition of NGOs (at the time of writing nearly seventy),2 
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which sought to build on the approach taken by the Jubilee 2000 movement that campaigned 
for the cancellation of Third World debt. 
Its founding statement published in June 2002 focused on the need to rebalance the rules 
of international trade. Its central argument was that: 
 
The international trade regime needs fundamental change if it is to succeed and 
benefit us all. The world needs international trade rules, but to date these have 
favoured the narrow commercial interests of the most powerful trading nations and 
the largest corporations, at the expense of the wider public interest and smaller 
economic enterprises (Trade Justice Movement, 2002). 
 
This initial statement was complemented by a huge mass lobby of Parliament on 19 June 
2002, which gave TJM a real sense of initial momentum (BBC News, 2002). At the time, the 
focus of TJM was on the multilateral rules being negotiated within the WTO. Its formation 
was a direct response to the launch of the Doha Round of the WTO, which claimed to have 
the aim of making the rules of global trade fairer for developing countries as its core remit. 
Since the early 2000s, things have changed quite significantly and the focus of TJM’s 
attention has shifted, as trade liberalisation has been largely enacted through bilateral and 
regional agreements. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The first section discusses the term ‘trade 
justice’ itself and considers both how it has been framed by actors within and outside of TJM 
and its relationship with ‘fair trade’, which has often been uneasy. The second section then 
interrogates the network approach adopted by TJM and how this has both helped and 
hindered aspects of its work. The third section discusses the evolution of TJM’s campaigning 
and particularly the extent to which African development has featured within its work. The 
chapter then concludes with some thoughts on the extent to which NGOs can influence the 
agenda on trade and how this relates to the British debate on African development. 
The overall argument of the chapter is that given the peculiarities of development 
campaigning in the UK and the centrality of Africa to some of its key campaigns, the work of 
TJM has often been bound-up with broader campaigns for African development. Whilst 
TJM’s campaigns have undoubtedly been important in highlighting the broader structural 
dynamics underpinning the challenges to development in Africa, due to a range of factors 
outlined below, its direct impact on policymaking has been somewhat limited. The UK 
Government’s commitment to the developmental benefits of free trade has remained 
consistent throughout the period of TJM’s existence, despite different political parties having 
been in power. What has changed, however, since the election of the Coalition Government 
in 2010, is a significant reduction in the close links to policymakers that TJM had enjoyed 
under New Labour. Nevertheless, TJM has had what can be understood as a discursive 
impact, by continually problematising the assumption that free trade promotes development, 
and in doing so attempting to rearticulate the debate on African development within the UK. 
 
The framing of ‘trade justice’ 
 
During the debates that resulted in the creation of TJM, there was of course significant 
discussion about what an appropriate name would be. One interviewee recalled that ‘there 
was quite a lot of debate about what phrase to use, but there weren’t many obvious 
alternatives, because it was about trade and people felt very strongly that justice was a more 
powerful concept than fair trade’.3 Since its formation the understanding of the relationship 
between trade and development, within TJM’s member organisations and the wider 
policymaking community, has traversed three distinct positions. First, a liberal conception of 
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trade justice informed by the idea that a rules-based system of free trade will promote 
development in the Global South, if the world’s major trading powers also commit to opening 
their markets. Second, a view rooted in the contemporary fair trade movement, which 
suggests that by adopting an alternative way of doing trade, producers in the Global South 
can be fairly rewarded for their goods, which in turn will promote development. A third, 
more radical understanding, views the structural inequalities within the system of global trade 
as the main obstacle to broad-based human development in the Global South. 
Given these competing frames, there remains a common misperception that both ‘trade 
justice’ and ‘fair trade’ are one and the same.4 Sharman (2007: 385) highlights that there are 
also overlaps in terms of some of the organisations involved, with some fair trade producers 
(e.g. Traidcraft) also campaigning for trade justice. The fact the two terms are often used 
almost interchangeably also highlights the attempts at co-optation by policymakers, which 
have to some extent served to neutralise the progressive power of the term ‘trade justice’. The 
stance of the UK Government has been largely consistent. Its view of trade justice has been a 
liberal one, where the emphasis is fairness combined with a belief in the power of free trade 
as a tool for development. For example, Tony Blair in his landmark speech to the Labour 
Party conference in 2001, argued that the problem for Africa was that free trade was not 
being fairly implemented. He argued that Africa needed ‘access to our markets so that we 
practise the free trade we are so fond of preaching’ (Blair, 2001). In 2011, then Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, outlined that trade, rather than aid, was of greater significance in 
relation to Africa’s future development. Adopting a similar stance to that of Blair a decade 
earlier, he called for free trade governed by rules ‘that must be open and fair to all’ 
(Cameron, 2011). 
Despite its more radical beginnings, the dominant contemporary conceptualisation of fair 
trade is focused on improvements to market access for producers from the developing world. 
This contrasts with the emphasis of TJM’s founding statement on the broader structural 
changes to the global trading system that are needed, rather than simply fair access to 
Western markets. This has been described by Fridell as the shaped-advantage perspective of 
fair trade, which simply offers ‘capability enhancement to a limited number of Southern 
partners’ (2006: 23). Reflecting on these tensions between trade justice and fair trade, some 
of the interviewees felt that the latter acts as a positive example of how trade can work 
differently and in the interests of social development. An interviewee from the Fairtrade 
Foundation summed up this argument by suggesting that ‘fair trade can be a gentle 
introduction … fair trade campaigners are more likely to want to campaign on trade justice 
because they are interested in trade and they’re interested in supply chains and they are 
interested in access of African people to European markets’.5 However, a number of 
interviewees questioned this premise. For example, one interviewee said that although there 
is a case to be made ‘that buying a fair trade product in a supermarket is a very easy first step 
to starting to take action. What I’m not at all convinced about is the journey that people make 
from buying that product to … actively participating in building a group of people who are 
going to take action in a stronger way’.6 
The liberal approach focused on market access and specifically the removal of 
agricultural subsidies in the US and the EU, was adopted by Oxfam International in its own 
campaign in 2002 entitled ‘Make Trade Fair’. This campaign, which received several 
celebrity endorsements, focused on a global petition that attracted 17.8 million signatures 
before being submitted to Pascal Lamy, the WTO’s Director-General at the time, at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial in December 2005 (Mallet and Lau, 2005). This caused some tensions in 
TJM at the time and there was some debate within Oxfam about whether it should continue to 
support the activities of TJM, given the power of its own brand, and the differences in its 
approach to conceptualising ‘trade justice’.7 
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Hence, there have been, and continue to remain, a variety of opinions over the framing of 
‘trade justice’ as a unifying concept for TJM and particularly how ‘fair trade’ sits within this. 
The original goal of some of the key advocates of fair trade within the UK was to create a 
model of alternative trade based on a more direct relationship with developing countries. 
However, the Fairtrade Foundation with its emphasis on increasing sales and ethical 
consumers has become ‘ever more reliant on MNCs and supermarkets in order to sustain this 
growth’ (Anderson, 2009: 237). This has recently resulted in the problematic decision taken 
by some major food companies to replace their use of the official Fairtrade Mark with their 
own certification schemes. In May 2017 it was revealed that the supermarket chain 
Sainsbury’s was going to drop the use of the Fairtrade Mark for its range of own-brand teas 
and replace it with the label ‘fairly traded’ based on its own set of criteria (Rivera, 2017). 
This has led to a coalition, co-ordinated by the Catholic Agency For Overseas Development 
(CAFOD), which also includes the Fairtrade Foundation itself, launching a campaign trying 
to put pressure on Sainsbury’s not to ditch the Fairtrade Mark. Meanwhile, Cadbury’s is also 
reported to be switching to the use of the Cocoa Life scheme of certification, which is run by 
Mondelez International who are the new owners of Cadbury’s (Murphy, 2016). In both cases 
the concern is that these alternatives lack the independence ensured through the Fairtrade 
Mark given that they are organised directly by the companies themselves. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that many of the interviewees expressed concerns about the 
increasing tensions and confusions of framing between ‘fair trade’ and ‘trade justice’. One 
interviewee noted that ‘there’s an interesting dynamic with … fair trade in its kind of purest 
form and the kind of emergence of the Fairtrade Mark and movement at the same point in 
time and the dynamics within that, which I think were never properly understood or 
resolved’.8 Another observed that in recent years the Fair Trade Movement in the UK has 
negotiated relationships with a wide range of corporate suppliers, whereas TJM has 
campaigned against proposed trade deals, like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) because there is a concern about an advancement of corporate interests 
over the rights of citizens.9 
In sum, on the issue of framing, the initial idea behind ‘trade justice’ was to make a 
moral or ethical case against the current structures of global trade. The overall aim of TJM 
has been to raise awareness of the problems with the existing structures and then use popular 
pressure to get the UK Government to seek to change them. While MPH found it relatively 
easy to make an accessible case to the public for debt cancellation and more aid, the case for 
regulatory reform of world trade, by its very nature has always been relatively 
underspecified. One interviewee noted that even at ‘the high watermark of Make Poverty 
History where the public were engaged with at some level the issues of global poverty, the 
trade bit never really came through. It was mentioned quite a lot but … people never made 
the leap of understanding as to what that really meant’.10 Africa, meanwhile, has featured 
quite strongly in the way that the issue of trade justice has been framed, particularly during 
the period of MPH. This compounded the difficulties of trying to define trade as a social 
justice issue. As Harrison argues, given the longer history of British campaigns for African 
development, ‘MPH illustrated how difficult it is to frame Africa within a British campaign 
for global social justice’ (2013: 178). The difficulties of framing ‘trade justice’ are also 
related to the organisational challenges faced by TJM to which I now turn. 
 
Organisational challenges and TJM’s network approach 
As a network of NGOs, TJM encompasses a wide variety of organisations, including trade 
unions, Friends of the Earth, and a range of both large and small development NGOs. As 
Saunders has argued, the adoption of organisational arrangements based on coalitions of 
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NGOs, as in the case of TJM, ‘have allowed once conventional humanitarian, aid and 
development NGOs to be active in both the global justice movement and the more staid arena 
of conventional NGO politics simultaneously’ (2009: 55). TJM currently has a co-ordinator 
employed directly by the network itself and then a Board made up of representatives who are 
elected annually by the member organisations themselves. It is quite a loose network and 
organisations within TJM can opt-in, as and when they choose to, depending on what the 
campaign issue is. It grew out of a more informal arrangement known as the UK Trade 
Network, which one interviewee described as ‘trade policy people from each of the main 
NGOs ... it was literally just a group, it was pretty much the same people who then became 
the policy group of the TJM’.11 
The creation of TJM followed the first significant development coalition campaign, 
Jubilee 2000, which was formed in October 1997. Many of the interviewees noted that the 
organisational set-up of TJM, was directly influenced by the experience of Jubilee 2000, 
which was focused on the cancellation of the external debts of developing countries. It had a 
much larger secretariat than TJM and it effectively became an organisation in itself, with a 
recognisable identity, rather than being a looser coalition of existing NGOs. One interviewee 
summed up quite starkly some of the issues related to how Jubilee 2000 had been organised: 
‘Ann Pettifor who was the Director of Jubilee 2000 was a very strong character, she’s high 
profile and she led the movement and the NGOs didn’t like that and so when they came to 
constructing new movements … like TJM and Make Poverty History they deliberately looked 
for models where there wasn’t a clear leader’.12 
Within networks of NGOs it tends to be the case that a limited number of organisations 
play a leading role in setting the overall agenda (Pianta, 2014: 215). This has certainly been 
true in the case of TJM. Reflecting on his time as the co-ordinator of TJM and the range of 
views of different member organisations, one interviewee concluded that ‘there were times 
where the different priorities at different organisations were difficult to work out politically ... 
TJM itself became a place of contestation and tension and that was largely welcome because 
it meant we needed to sort of sharpen what we were doing and sharpen our 
communication’.13 In particular, there were debates within TJM about the balance to strike 
between pursuing incremental changes and the more fundamental vision of trade justice 
articulated in its founding statement. More recently, the way TJM has worked has reduced the 
potential for such conflicts because member organisations are more able to pick and choose 
which campaigns they wish to support. It is suggested that ‘people do work in less formal 
ways now, so that we kind of know that if we tried to get a massive sign on statement that 
everyone can sign up to, people are probably not going to be that happy with it’.14 
TJM is also a domestically-based network within the UK. However, within Europe it has 
been argued that domestic trade justice campaigns have found it particularly hard to have an 
impact on policy because trade is an area that is delegated to the EU (Pianta, 2014: 219). 
There were attempts, particularly during the campaign on Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) to work across Europe and with African civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of 
a wider ‘Stop EPAs’ campaign (discussed below). One interviewee suggested that when a 
coalition is extended even more, in this fashion, the range of views becomes broader and this 
can make political agreement and decision-making even more difficult.15 More recently, TJM 
has worked with the Seattle to Brussels Network, which operates across Europe, in 
contributing to the publication of an ‘Alternative Trade Mandate’, which was launched in 
November 2013 by a European-wide alliance of CSOs (See Alternative Trade Mandate 
Alliance, 2013). However, given the broad nature of actors involved in drafting this 




In sum, what TJM has been able to do over the course of its existence is keep trade on the 
agenda in the UK campaigning context, despite some of the bigger member organisations not 
having persisted with it as a priority for any significant length of time. As an established 
coalition it has been able to preserve access to domestic policymakers.17 After the dissolution 
of MPH in early 2006, Oxfam and Christian Aid in particular, shifted their focus to other 
campaign issues, most notably climate change.18 However, the work of smaller organisations 
like War on Want and Global Justice Now (formerly World Development Movement) and the 
impact of TJM as a co-ordinating network, has meant that some of the peaks and troughs in 
terms of interest among the big NGOs have been smoothed out.19 What TJM creates is both a 
knowledge base on trade and a ready-made structure so that when trade issues come to the 
fore again (as in the recent cases of TTIP and Brexit) a wider coalition can easily be re-
formed.20 In the next section, I explore in more detail how African development has featured 
explicitly within TJM’s campaigning since its formation. 
 
African development and TJM’s campaigning 
 
TJM’s initial focus was a campaign aimed at advancing the issue of agricultural subsidies in 
the North within the WTO and in particular a call for reforms to the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). In part, this was justified on the basis of supporting African 
farmers by seeking to improve their market access. However, this was an agenda that was 
somewhat limited in its critique of existing structures. In fact, the UK Government was at 
times able to frame it as an issue that could be seen to be allied to the broader push in favour 
of, rather than critical of, trade liberalisation (Sharman, 2007: 387). It was felt within TJM at 
this point that whilst there was some traction in terms of the UK Government listening to 
what it had to say, there was a concern that there seemed to be ‘an intention to portray the 
TJM as pro-trade liberalisation’.21 Developing countries remained an important part of TJM’s 
campaigning during 2003 as they switched their emphasis to the WTO Ministerial in Cancún. 
In response to efforts by both the EU and the US to extend trade liberalisation into new areas 
such as investment, competition policy and government procurement, TJM aligned 
themselves with several governments in the Global South who sought to block the 
introduction of these new issues into the WTO’s negotiating agenda. 
In the UK, trade justice as an idea became more familiar during 2005 as it became one of 
the three key demands made by the MPH coalition. The other two central aspects of this 
campaign coalition were the cancellation of the external debts of poor countries and a 
demand for more and better aid. The idea of MPH was first conceived in October 2003, with 
the plan being to focus on 2005 given that the UK Government was both hosting the G8 
summit in July and would be holding the presidency of the EU during the second half of that 
year (Saunders, 2009: 52). During 2004 the MPH campaign then set out its key demands and 
throughout this period, as Harrison suggests, ‘the issues remained generic and transnational – 
that is, based on broad moral arguments with little reference to specific situations, and with 
no spatial focus beyond that of the Global South’ (2010: 394). 
However, as the MPH campaign developed, we saw an explicit Africanisation of the 
agenda. Harrison convincingly argues that despite initial attempts not to focus specifically on 
Africa, ‘MPH consciously selected a historical narrative (abolition, apartheid, and debt) 
within which to place itself which was to all intents and purposes ‘African’, which then 
became a synonym for poverty’ (2013: 165). TJM’s position within MPH meant it was 
unavoidably drawn into this framing.22 One of the members of the MPH co-ordination team 
concurs with Harrison’s reading, suggesting that, during 2005, trade was ‘framed within the 
context of Africa … instead of a focus on the … sweep of neoliberal trade agreements and 
WTO’.23 This was all a very long way from the broader rules and structures identified by 
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TJM at its foundation. As a result, it was possible for MPH to be co-opted into New Labour’s 
‘year of Africa’ in 2005 and the idea of trade justice was re-defined in terms of access to 
Northern markets. This is evident in the findings of Blair’s Commission for Africa (CfA), 
which focused its trade recommendations on the removal of agricultural subsidies to allow 
African economies to realise their ‘true’ comparative advantage (Hurt, 2007: 360). 
Following the formal dissolution of the MPH campaign coalition in 2006, TJM entered a 
new era with fewer resources and a significantly reduced public profile. This period saw TJM 
respond to the shift away from the WTO and multilateral trade governance, towards bilateral 
and regional trade agreements, and specifically the EU’s negotiation of EPAs with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. EPAs constituted an attempt by the EU to move away 
from its system of non-reciprocal trade preferences for ACP states, to a series of regional free 
trade agreements that would be compliant with WTO rules. However, the EU also sought to 
introduce its new trade issues that went far beyond what was required for WTO-compatibility 
(Hurt, 2012: 501-2). Together with NGOs across Europe and Africa, TJM was involved in 
the launch of a new campaign, organised by the ‘Stop EPAs’ coalition. This highlighted the 
difficulties for UK-based trade campaigners because of the central role played by the 
European Commission in trade policymaking. TJM had to adopt a two-step approach by first 
trying to convince the UK Government to alter its policy stance and then encouraging it to 
push for a change in the EU’s negotiating mandate on EPAs. 
The central focus of the campaign on EPAs was to prevent the EU introducing the new 
issues that had been successfully resisted a few years before at the WTO’s Cancún 
Ministerial. It was felt that their inclusion reflected the EU’s strategic trade interests, rather 
than the development needs of ACP states (Trade Justice Movement, 2007). The other main 
aim was to slow the process of negotiations down beyond the initial deadline of 31 December 
2007, which had been set by the EU. In this sense, the work of TJM was effective given that, 
aside from the EPA negotiated with the Caribbean region, the negotiations were extended 
well beyond this deadline. As part of this campaign, on 19 April 2007, TJM organised a 
simultaneous lobby of every European embassy in the UK, which was supported by roughly 
1,000 activists (Saunders, 2009: 51). Moreover, the UK Government both accepted that the 
new trade issues should not be included in EPA negotiations, unless ACP states specifically 
requested them, and committed to work with other member states to change the European 
Commission’s stance on this (Sharman, 2007: 389). 
One of the key points about the campaign on EPAs is that it was part of a wider action 
that involved CSOs across Europe and Africa. An interviewee from the Fairtrade Foundation 
highlighted how ‘certainly around EPAs there was a whole period when organisations were 
quite actively bringing concerns being expressed by developing countries’.24 It has been 
convincingly argued that this wider campaign had an impact on the discursive nature of the 
EPA negotiations, by questioning their developmental potential, making them ‘a politically 
contentious issue instead of a technical-administrative affair’ (Del Felice, 2014: 159). The 
discursive impact of this NGO campaign helped enable African states during the EPA 
negotiations to engage in a process of ‘rhetorical entrapment of the EU’ (Hurt, Lee and 
Lorenz-Carl, 2013: 83). 
In more recent years, the work of TJM had become less visible since the high-water mark 
of 2005. Its focus on bilateral trade agreements has continued although this shifted away from 
Africa and towards the EU’s negotiation of both TTIP with the United States and a 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada. The main emphasis of this 
work has been on the potential consequences of regulatory harmonisation for upholding 
socio-economic and environmental rights within the EU. Of concern for TJM and the wider 
campaign against TTIP, has been the potential inclusion of an Investor-State Dispute 
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Settlement mechanism, which would allow transnational corporations to sue governments 
that introduce measures which they deem to be detrimental to their ability to make profits. 
Although, even during this campaign, TJM has sought to try to articulate the precedent 
TTIP might have for future trade agreements with developing countries. For example, in 
February 2014 they submitted written evidence to the inquiry into TTIP organised by the EU 
Sub-Committee on External Affairs within the House of Lords. Here it was suggested that 
any rules contained in a deal between the EU and US are likely to become the template for 
future trade negotiations with developing countries.25 Moreover, in a report on TTIP’s 
relationship to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it concluded that: 
 
As the blueprint for multilateral trade, it undermines the global partnership for 
sustainable development and directly challenges the ability of individual countries to 
develop their own strategies for poverty reduction and sustainable development. 
Instead, it sets a powerful precedent that promotes privatisation and liberalisation as 
the de facto policy option and seeks to ‘discipline’ state involvement in key sectors 
such as public service delivery and industrial strategy (Trade Justice Movement, 
2015: 30). 
 
One of the most significant recent developments in relation to the work of TJM has been the 
referendum result of 23 June 2016 in favour of the UK leaving the EU. It now seems clear 
that Brexit will result in the UK leaving the customs union and becoming independently 
responsible for trade policy. As Langan notes in Chapter 2 above, during the referendum 
campaign, some leading Brexiteers suggested a good reason for leaving the EU was that it 
would allow the UK to develop a more progressive trade policy to Africa. Such claims have 
provided a new urgency and contemporary relevance to TJM’s campaigning. Given the focus 
on securing a trade deal with the EU itself, and other key partners like the US, it seems 
inevitable that Africa will not be a priority for the UK Government, as it begins to formulate 
an independent trade policy. The Government’s recent White Paper suggests that for future 
trade with developing countries, the main aim will be to ensure continuity of market access, 
whereby the UK adopts a preference scheme that at least matches what the EU currently 
offers (Department for International Trade, 2017: 31-33). 
Brexit has therefore provided a context for NGOs in the UK to once again combine a 
focus on trade with development issues. TJM has argued that Brexit provides an opportunity 
for the UK to adopt a trade policy that guarantees for countries in the Global South ‘the best 
possible development outcomes by supporting regional integration and market 
diversification, and by strengthening local industries that develop value-added products’ 
(Trade Justice Movement, 2017: 1). On this basis they are much closer to the Labour Party’s 
emerging position on future trade with Africa. In a recent speech, Barry Gardiner, Shadow 
Secretary of State for International Trade, acknowledged how controversial the negotiation of 
EPAs has been and that the UK should avoid forcing African countries to liberalise in the 
future (Gardiner, 2017). 
In sum, what this review of TJM’s campaigns demonstrates is the reactive nature of 
much of its work. Rather than determine a definitive blueprint for trade justice it has, to some 
extent understandably, fallen into a pattern of reacting to ever-changing empirical 
developments. In part, this is the nature of the issue area and without TJM it is unlikely that 
trade would have retained the profile it has in relation to campaigning on African 
development. One interviewee neatly encapsulated how trade is rather different to other key 
campaign areas for development NGOs, by noting that ‘debt and aid are quantitative 
campaigns, they are saying we want more of something or less of something, trade is not 
quantitative, it’s a qualitative campaign and they are harder, you know because there are 
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shades of grey. But there ought to be shades of grey on the aid and debt one but there 
weren’t’.26 
 
Conclusions: can NGOs influence the agenda on trade? 
 
As other scholars (e.g. Bendell and Ellersiek, 2010) have noted it is hard to make a 
quantitative assessment of the impact of NGO campaigning on policy. In some cases, it may 
even be that policies change broadly in line with NGO demands, but for other reasons, and 
not as any direct result of these. Koenig-Archibugi (2014) suggests that one way to reflect on 
what aspects might determine the potential influence of NGOs is to consider internal and 
external factors. Internal factors include the effectiveness of coalition building and the extent 
to which there are other interest groups providing opposition to the arguments being 
advocated, whereas external factors would acknowledge the important role played by states 
and the structures of global governance. The analysis presented in this chapter, suggests that 
in the case of TJM, whilst internal factors are not insignificant, external factors are of greater 
importance. 
Similarly, different positions exist in the literature on the potential impact of NGOs in the 
specific area of trade. Pianta (2014) provides quite an optimistic assessment by focusing on 
longer-term attempts to reframe the issue. He suggests that since Cancún in 2003 the speed of 
multilateral trade liberalisation has slowed, as a direct result of NGOs forming coalitions with 
like-minded governments in the Global South, although as a result we have seen the rise of 
bilateral agreements (ibid.: 219). In contrast, De Bièvre focuses more on the day-to-day of 
trade policymaking and highlights the effective lobbying of firms and business organisations, 
which for him results in the conclusion that ‘CSO influence on global trade policy is a glass 
quite empty rather than half full’ (ibid.: 227). 
At the European level a formal process of engagement does now take place between 
policymakers and NGOs, via the Civil Society Dialogue. However, it has been suggested that 
this has not has been translated into meaningful influence on the outcomes of trade policy 
(Orbie et. al., 2016: 532). Historically, the delegation of trade policy from the UK 
Government to the EU has made TJM’s work that bit harder, given that without European co-
ordination it is hard to have any impact. 
At the core of TJM’s work since 2000 has been the idea of ‘trade justice’ as an 
alternative to free trade, which remains the ultimate and ambitious goal of the coalition. If we 
use this as our yardstick for measuring TJM’s impact, then we would have to conclude it has 
been limited. The UK Government’s support for trade liberalisation remains at least as strong 
as it was at the time of TJM’s formation. Reflecting on this, one interviewee questioned 
whether this is ‘a failure of the movement, I think it’s a reflection of how hard it is’.27 
During their time in power, New Labour were very effective in promoting a position of 
common cause with the work of TJM, and subsequently the broader MPH alliance during 
2005. These rather close links appear to have been far less evident during both the Coalition 
Government of 2010-15 and Conservative rule since the general election in May 2015. In 
fact, one could argue that in relation to Africa, the ‘prosperity agenda’ advanced by both the 
Coalition Government and its Conservative successor, is even more resolutely in favour of 
trade liberalisation; with the emphasis on the benefits trade can bring to both economic 
growth in Africa and UK exporters. As a result, on the issue of trade, where the gap between 
policymakers and NGOs is much wider than on other issues like aid (where there is a broad 
consensus among the main political parties on the 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income 
(GNI) target), lobbying can be a rather ineffective tool. 
Nevertheless, TJM has done much to mobilise UK citizens on the issue of trade. 
Although the mass lobbies of Parliament and European embassies took place some time ago, 
11 
 
without the important co-ordination role performed by TJM, trade would have struggled to 
retain a place on the agenda of many development NGOs in the UK. By introducing the 
concept of ‘trade justice’, TJM has helped to frame African development within the broader 
structural logics of the global economy, rather than the more familiar frame based on aid. 
This has not been consistently achieved, however, and particularly during the era of MPH, 
the message on trade justice was, to a large extent, drowned out. With Brexit likely to result 
in an independent UK trade policy, it is an issue area, which will become increasingly 
important to the debate on African development in the future. 
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